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Abstract. An Electronic Institution includes a normative environment with 
rules and norms for agents’ interoperability, and is also a service providing 
platform that assists agents in the task of establishing and conducting normative 
relationships (contracts). Using this platform, agents representing organizations 
willing to engage in a collective contractual activity select partners according to 
different factors, including their capabilities, current business needs and 
information on past business experiences that may be used as inputs to trust 
building. In our framework we have designed a tightly coupled connection 
between electronic contract monitoring and a computational trust model. In this 
paper, we explain the rationale behind this connection and detail how it is 
materialized. In particular, we explain how our situation-aware trust model 
relies on past contractual behavior to dynamically build up a trustworthiness 
image of each agent that can be helpful for future encounters. Experiments with 
simplified scenarios show the effectiveness of our approach. 
1 Introduction 
An Electronic Institution (EI) [1] is a software platform including a core infrastructure 
– a normative environment – which embraces the norms that apply to contracts as 
established among agents. A central role of an EI is to make this environment 
operational, in the sense that contractual norms will be monitored for compliance, and 
consequently norm violations will be reacted upon. Furthermore, an EI provides a set 
of services that assist agents in the task of establishing and conducting normative 
relationships. Therefore, not only are we interested in monitoring the compliance of 
agents with the norms they voluntarily adhere to through contracting, but also in 
providing computational tools that help on automating the creation of such contracts. 
The services that we include in an EI are of utmost importance for secure and 
reliable agent interoperability and cover a broad range of MAS research issues: 
• Automatic negotiation [2]: automates partner selection upon a business opportunity 
and is based on negotiation protocols exhibiting properties such as information 
privacy, qualitative feedback and adaptation; 
• Contract monitoring and enforcement [3]: monitors parties’ compliance with 
 contractual terms and applies specified sanctions in violations occur; 
• Computational trust [4]: aggregates trust information from past contractual 
behavior, which allows agents to make informed decisions regarding the selection 
of partners and/or the negotiation of contracts. 
When designing an integrated approach that includes these services (Figure 1), we 
must also consider the interconnections among them. In order to move from the 
negotiation process to contract monitoring, contract drafting must be taken into 
account. We may instantiate contract templates with the outcome of negotiation, or 
include in the negotiation process itself the specification of specific contract clauses. 
Contracts resulting from successful negotiations may then be validated, registered and 
digitally signed, before being handed to a normative environment for monitoring and 
enforcement purposes. Finally, the way agents enact their contracts provides 
important information for trust building. A repository of trust information may then 
complete the circle by providing relevant inputs for future negotiations. The 
integration of all these stages (Figure 1) has been addressed through the development 
of an EI Platform for B2B Contracting. 
 
Fig. 1. Electronic Institution services for B2B contracting. 
A specific and most relevant case of joint activity that we have been looking at is 
the Virtual Enterprise (VE), seen as a temporary organization composed of 
autonomous enterprises, formed to address a specific business opportunity. One 
requirement for the successful creation of a VE is a fast set-up phase, which in an 
open environment may lead to the need to establish contracts with new partners 
whose past contractual performance is not known. Therefore, the regulation of the 
operation stage of the VE through an electronic contract is important, as is the 
aggregation of trust information that can be used to make more informed decisions 
concerning the selection of future business partners. 
An important role of a normative environment in an EI is, thus, to record the way 
contracts are enacted, making it possible to build up models of agents’ trustworthiness 
that are based on their past performance. This information can then be used as an 
important source for possible future encounters with other agents. In this paper we 
will focus on the relationship between contract monitoring and the construction of 
trust indicators. The main research question we are here dealing with can be 
summarized as follows: is it possible to benefit from specific information on an 
 agent’s contractual behavior to better tune its trustworthiness and, as a consequence, 
influence the way partners are selected in future contracts? Our hypothesis is that a 
better characterization of agents’ trustworthiness brings a better ability to select 
partners and, therefore, results in more successful contracts. 
In Section 2 we describe the normative environment and its interfaces to other EI 
components. Section 3 describes how a trust model can be enhanced using detailed 
contractual information in order to permit context-aware trust assessment. Section 4 
evaluates of our situation-aware trust model, and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2 A Normative Environment for Contract Monitoring 
The role of a normative environment is, besides providing a set of regulations under 
which agents’ collective work is made possible, to check whether agents are willing 
to follow the norms they commit to (monitoring), and further to employ correction 
measures as a means of coercing agents to comply (enforcement). We represent in the 
normative environment’s structure the normative relations that correspond to 
contracts established by real world entities [1]. The “shape” of the environment will 
therefore evolve and adapt to the actual contractual situations that are established. 
This contrasts to other approaches of normative environments (e.g. [5]), where the 
normative relations that can be established are completely predefined. 
We aim at providing an infrastructure in which business entities are represented by 
software agents and, through them, are able to interact with the computational 
normative environment using speech acts. When monitoring compliance with norms 
that apply to specific contracts, the normative environment will be recording a 
mapping from relevant interactions (which concern business exchanges) that take 
place. The connection between real-world interactions and the institutional 
environment is made through illocutions (speech acts) that agents perform with the 
intent of informing the environment that certain contract-related events have occurred. 
With an appropriate interface between the normative environment and the statements 
that agents make, we build an image of relevant real-world transactions that are 
through this means institutionally recognized. We call this image institutional reality, 
after [6]. The main mechanism that we use in order to certify a real-world event is that 
of empowerment [7]: agents enacting specific roles (e.g. bank, delivery tracker) are 
seen by the EI as trusted third parties, and are as such certified to obtain specific 
institutional facts, which are related with business transactions. 
We take the stance that it is in the best interest of agents to publicize their abidance 
to contractual commitments. They do so by interacting with the institution's trusted 
third parties in order to convince the EI that they are in fact complying. 
2.1 Modeling and Monitoring Contractual Obligations 
When establishing a contract, partners make commitments regarding the business to 
be enacted, which from the point of view of contract law [8] are expressed as 
obligations. We model contractual obligations as directed liveline and deadline 
 obligations to bring about a specific state of affairs [3]: ,( ≺ 	 ≺ 
) represents 
the obligation of agent b (the bearer) towards agent c (the counterparty) to bring about 
fact f between liveline l and deadline d. A normative state records every element that 
is relevant in contract enactment – institutional reality elements, or IRE (Table 1). 
Table 1. Institutional reality elements used by the computational trust service 
Element Is-a Specific slots Description 
IRE  contract, 
when 
An IRE pertains to a contract and is 
obtained at a specific time point 
Obligation IRE bearer,counterparty 
fact, 
liveline,deadline 
Prescribed obligation of bearer towards 
counterparty to bring about a fact 
between a liveline and  a deadline 
DeadlineViolation IRE obligation An obligation‘s deadline was violated 
LivelineViolation IRE obligation An obligation‘s liveline was violated 
Fulfillment IRE obligation An obligation was fulfilled 
Violation IRE Obligation An obligation was violated 
Monitoring rules capture interrelations among these elements, e.g. by saying that if 
the obliged fact is brought about between the liveline and the deadline then the 
obligation is fulfilled (this element is added to the normative state). Similarly, if a 
deadline violation occurs then the obligation might be declared as violated (see [3] for 
details). Our approach takes advantage of using Jess [9], a forward-chaining rule-
based system, which enables a straightforward implementation of monitoring rules. 
An electronic representation of a contract includes a set of norms that specify how 
business is to be enacted. A norm is a rule whose condition analyzes the current 
normative state and whose conclusion prescribes obligations agents ought to fulfill. 
Sanctions may be imposed by prescribing obligations upon violation elements. 
2.2 Interfacing 
The normative environment includes a subscription mechanism that enables its use as 
a tool to alert agents when certain contract-related events occur or are eminent, such 
as the activation of a contractual obligation or a forthcoming deadline. Agents have to 
subscribe the normative environment in order to be notified about events related to the 
contracts in which they participate. This also allows interfacing the contract 
monitoring service with the Computational Trust service. 
Our platform implementation is based on JADE [10], and the subscription 
mechanism is based on the FIPA-Subscribe interaction protocol [11]. There, an agent 
sends a subscription message to a service that will be providing notifications of events 
regarding the kind of information the subscriber is interested in. In our case, the 
initiator uses a template in order to filter the contracts and events he is interested in.  
3 Computational Trust System 
Whenever an agent (representing a company or individual) is willing to recruit new 
partners for future joint work, potential risky relationships arises. Electronic 
 Institutions, because they may track record of all relevant interactions that took place 
in the past, are well suited to provide trustworthiness information on agents, 
minimizing the risk in future engagements. Moreover, they are able to follow agents’ 
contract establishment and monitoring, providing an ideal framework for recording 
the needed information about how and in which context previous obligations have 
been dealt with by every agent. This allows us to specify a situation-aware trust 
method that goes beyond traditional, non-contextual trust methods that just estimate a 
global trustworthiness score for the agents in assessment, lacking a more elaborate 
and precise information of the agent’s adequacy to different particular situations. 
We are also concerned with the performance of the method when the trust 
evidences available about a given target agent are scarce and heterogeneous, and 
when the activity of the agents under evaluation can span through different situations 
and contexts. The current implementation of our system that encompasses the 
proposed method is composed of two different modules, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Fig. 2. The current implementation of our trust system 
The Aggregator component is responsible for aggregating the available trust 
evidences of an agent into a trust score. Several trust engines that are defined in the 
literature can be used ([12]), although we are interested on engines that model the 
dynamics of trust, as those described in [13] and [14], as they appear to perform better 
than the traditional statistical approaches. The Contextual Fitness component tunes 
the outcome of the aggregation step by taking into consideration the specificities of 
the current business opportunity and the adequacy of the target agent to them. 
The idea behind this extension is that if the trust system detects that a target agent 
has some kind of handicap related to the current business necessity, the available 
overall trustworthiness has to reflect that and further influence the possible selection 
for future partnerships in similar contexts. At present, agent handicaps are being 
derived solely from the Fulfilment and Violation IREs (cf. Table 1) received 
from the normative environment concerning the agent past contractual activities. Our 
next step is to use other kinds of information related with specific obligations (e.g. 
liveline and deadline violations) in order to draw a more complete and accurate 
profile of the agent in that particular situation under assessment.  
One good characteristic of this modular approach is that the contextual fitness 
component can be used together with any conventional trust aggregation engine, 
being it based on statistical, probabilistic or heuristic models, as it is the case of those 
reviewed in [12]. Before we further describe the current state of the Contextual 
Fitness component, we first introduce the notation and the scenario used in the paper. 
 3.1 Scenario and Notation 
In this paper, we consider a simulation scenario where, at every round, a given 
number of agents that want to explore a new business opportunity broadcast a 
business need specifying a fabric to buy, a quantity and a delivery time. The selection 
of the best partner to deal with takes into account the estimated trustworthiness of 
each candidate agent that responds to the specific business need. 
We define   () ∈ [0, 1] as the trustworthiness value of an agent As, in the 
eye of agent Ac, as computed by a traditional trust aggregator engine, where  ∈  is 
an agent from the set C of client agents, and  ∈  is an agent from the set S of 
supplier agents. We also define adequacy trust 
(,  ) ∈ {0, 1} as a binary 
operator for situation-awareness purposes, where  ∈ ! describes the business 
need, i.e. an instance of the space AT of all possible combinations of attribute-value 
pairs that describe the need (e.g. {fabric=‘cotton’, quantity=‘900000’, delivery 
time=‘15’}). For scalability, all numeric values are previously quantified into 
categories (e.g. low, medium, high) using fuzzy logic techniques. 
Therefore, the trustworthiness value of agent As as seen by agent Ac in the specific 
context at is given by the following equation: 
  (, ) =   () ∗ 
(,  ) (1) 
Finally, a contractual evidence represents a transaction at time t between agents Ac 
and As, for which an outcome $ ∈ {%, 	%} is generated. It is derived from the 
Fulfillment and Violation obligation events produced by the normative environment 
(Table 1). Therefore, associated to each agent in the Electronic Institution is a history 
of its past contractual evidences, each represented by the tuple < , , , , $ >. 
3.2 The Contextual Fitness Component 
The Contextual Fitness (CF) component is based on an online, incremental and 
flexible technique of behavior tendencies extraction that we have developed. Current 
version of CF uses information gain ([15]), a well known metric used in machine 
learning for classification. This metric is based on the entropy concept of information 
theory, and is defined in (2), where ()*(, ) is the information gain of attribute  
relative to a collection of samples , +%() is the set of all possible values for 
attribute , and ,  is the subset of  for which attribute  has value - ([15]). 
()*(, ) ≡ /*$01() − 3 |,||| /*$01(,),56789:;()
 
(2) 
In our approach, we use this metric to dynamically learn a decision tree from the 
history of evidences of agent As, every time it is necessary to verify the adequacy of 
the agent proposal to the current client need. We use all the evidences available, 
(which might be scarce) about the supplier to build the decision tree. No training or 
testing phases are performed. After that, the failure tendencies of the agent in 
evaluation are extracted from the rules pointing to false outcomes. Figure 3 depicts a 
decision tree that was learnt for a given supplier in a specific experiment we have run.  
 good = cotton 
| dtime = low: false 
| dtime = medium: true 
| dtime = big: null 
good = chiffon: null 
good = voile: false 
Fig. 3. Decision tree generated in our simulations 
For the tree above, our algorithm identified that, at the time of this particular 
assessment, the agent showed a tendency to fail contracts (outcome=false) that match 
the tendencies (<$$
 = $$*,∗, 
)=% = $>) and (<$$
 = -$)%,∗,∗). Thus, the 
trustworthiness value   (, ) of agent , as given by Equation 1, would be 
zero if situation  matched any of the tendencies derived from the learned decision 
tree; otherwise, it would be given by the   () component of Equation 1. 
Several issues may arise from the use of the information gain criteria in our 
technique, such as the need to use similar metrics that permit missing attributes. Also, 
as we pointed out before, the approach may be further enhanced with more specific 
information about the agent’s behaviour, distinguishing beyond contract 
failure/success and recording more fine grained information on specific contractual 
clause violations. We address these improvements in future work. 
4 Experiments    
In order to evaluate our trust model, we use the textile scenario mentioned in the 
previous section. We generate a population in which all suppliers have different 
handicaps (95% probability to fail) on performing some particular aspect of a 
business transaction. For instance, some suppliers tend to fail to deliver fabric in short 
delivery dates, while others might fail to deliver high quantities of any fabric type. 
Handicaps on more than one contractual attribute are also possible (e.g. a supplier 
with a handicap in delivering high quantities of material in low delivery times). 
We evaluated three different trust models: SA (SinAlpha), a trust aggregator using 
dynamics of trust [14]; CS, a model that enhances traditional trust models by 
considering the situation in assessment [16]. It uses domain specific, predefined 
similarity metrics to predict unanticipated situations (for an overview of similar 
models, see [4]); and CF, our contextual fitness technique described in Section 3.2, 
used here in conjunction with the SA approach. It is a situation-aware trust model, 
designed to fit well to non parochial open market scenarios, where the number of 
available trust evidences for a particular partner agent might be scarce. 
4.1 Evaluation of the Performance of Trust Models 
In a first set of experiments, we evaluate the performance of the CF technique and 
compare it with the other two trust models. We use two metrics: the average utility of 
clients at every round, measured by the ratio given by the number of succeed 
 contracts over the number of all contracts in the round; and the number of different 
suppliers that were selected by all the negotiating clients at every round. 
Figure 4 shows the results obtained. We can observe (at the bottom) that both the 
SA and the CS approaches are relatively conservative (parochial) concerning the 
selection of partners, with the 20 clients in the experiment choosing in average 9 to 
10.5 different suppliers at each round, while CF explores a slightly higher number of 
suppliers. This fact seems to be related with the utility achieved by each approach, as 
can be observed from the top plots of the graphic. In fact, the approach that is able to 
select from a greater number of different suppliers (the CF approach) also gets in 
average significant better utility (90.46%) than the other two approaches (83.30% for 
SA, and 85.87% for CS), leading to a number of succeeded contracts very close to the 
maximum of 19 (i.e. 95% of 20) contracts. 
 
Fig. 4. Average utility obtained (top) and average number of selected suppliers (bottom) 
The results obtained show how the combined use of our technique and detailed 
contractual information is effective in discovering the particular contract enactment 
handicaps of the agents in assessment, and how it is able to do so, irrespective of the 
number of trust evidences available for each agent under evaluation. 
4.2 Evaluation of CF Behavior in Open Markets 
In a second set of experiments, we evaluated whether the CF ability to explore more 
supplier agents could safely bring higher utility. Two different kinds of CF clients 
were generated: a conservative (parochial) one, which selects from a more restricted 
set of known partners, based solely on trustworthiness, and a more explorative (non-
parochial) one, that explores outside this set. We have also introduced the notion of 
supplier agents’ value, reflecting characteristics such as their environmental and 
ethical policies or usual payment method. The value of each supplier – used by 
explorative agents – is initialized with a random value in set {0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9}. 
This value is only presented to a client after the first transaction between both agents. 
Before that, clients estimate a value of 1.0 for unknown suppliers, making it attractive 
to non-parochial clients to explore new partners. Finally, explorative agents select the 
partners with whom they will trade based on the utility expected from the transaction, 
which is the product of the trustworthiness score of agents and their internal value.  
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 We use the following metrics: number of successful contracts achieved by all 
clients at every negotiation round and respective average number of contracts over all 
rounds; the number of different suppliers selected at every round; and the average 
utility achieved by the clients at every round and its average score over all rounds. 
We verified that, despite similar results concerning the average number of 
successful contracts per client (conservative: 90.89%; explorative: 90.67%), the latter 
leads to a significantly higher utility (75.25%) than the former strategy (68.59%). As 
can be observed in Figure 5, the strategy used by the clients does not alter in a 
significant way the number of successful contracts achieved by the clients at every 
round, nor the number of different suppliers chosen per round. However, the big 
difference on the results obtained by each strategy resides on the utility achieved 
through them. In fact, after the first rounds of exploration, the non parochial strategy 
got systematically higher utility than the parochial strategy. 
 
Fig. 5. Comparison between parochial and non-parochial client strategies 
An important conclusion taken from these experiments is that with our situation-
aware trust model, that uses contractual trust evidences, a client agent may feel safe to 
explore other potentially trustable partners outside its previous group of 
acquaintances, which in turn can bring him increased benefits (e.g. better prices). 
5 Conclusions 
Doing business electronically should benefit from the development of tools that 
enable the automation of e-contracting tasks. In this paper we have introduced a way 
to take advantage of two such tools, made available as services in an Electronic 
Institution platform. A normative environment providing a contract monitoring 
facility is used as a source of contract enactment events that feeds a computational 
situation-aware trust engine. 
We experimentally evaluated the benefits derived from combining our situation-
aware trust model with the contract events received from the normative environment. 
We conclude that this combination allows business agents to seek business partners 
outside their breeding trading acquaintances in a safe environment, conferring to these 
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 agents higher levels of utility than the ones obtained with other trust approaches found 
in the literature. As future work, we intend to further explore the information provided 
by the normative environment in order to increase even more the capabilities of the 
trust system and the effectiveness of the partners’ selection process. 
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